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. PIONEER PUBLISHERS .. NEW YORK 
Introduction 
THIS PAMPHLET has heen translated from the March, 1937 issue of 
Nouvelles d'U.R.S.S., an information bulletin published by the "Que 
Faire?" group in France. The "Que Faire?" group is a dissident 
Communist tendency, whose best known leader is Andre Ferrat, until 
two years ago a member of the Political Bureau of the French Com-
munist Party. Though this group split away from the Communist 
Party on the basis of sharp opposition to the new policies of the 
Communist International, in particular to Popular Frontism and to 
the position on the question of war now held ·by the Communist 
International, it is nevertheless severely critical of "Trotskyism" ·and 
of the Fourth Internationalists, represented in France by the P.O.I. 
(Parti Ouvrier Internationaliste). 
The analysis made in this article, it will he observed, is remarkably 
"non-tendencious" in character. It presupposes no agreement with, 
or even interest in, the political views of its ·author. It is a cold and 
sober study of the nature and methods of the Radek-Piatakov Trial, 
a calm evaluation of the evidential weight of the statements made 
therein by the defendants, the "witnesses," and the Prosecutor. The 
central conclusion-namely, that the confessions 'are false and that it 
is irnpo$sible to explain the confessions if they are accepted as true 
-is proved with genuinely sc~entific rigidity. It is entirely safe to 
predict that there will be no rational answers to the analyses and 
arguments of this study. 
In addition, this article suggests a positive hypothesis to expl'ain 
. "why they confessed." It should he noticed that this hypothesis is 
altogether independent of the rest of the analysis. It is in no sense 
necessary to accept this positive explanation in order to accept the 
rest of the analysis. The rest stands on its own feet. F or my part, I 
regard the hypothesis here stated as only one phase of the total 
explanation. 
And, in general, it should be noticed that the question of the 
objective truth or falsity of the confessions can be answered without 
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any reference to the speculative psychological question of "why they 
confessed." The methods made use of in this pamphlet are sufficient 
to demonstrate that the confessions are false, and that the Trials are 
a frame-up whatever the psychological explanation may be of the 
conduct of the defendants. Thi~ point is of the very greatest signifi-
cance in arriving at an estimate of the Trials. 
The method of this article, with its absence of political bias, has a 
peculiar value in clarifying the problem of the Trials for a point of 
view external to the political conflicts and interests which are focused 
by the Trials. It shows that we are compelled to conclude that the 
confessions are false and the Trials a frame-up even though we do 
not "take sides" with reference to the political conflicts or even under-
stand those conflicts. Nevertheless, this method of approach imposes 
also a ~imitation. The Trials present, it is true, a scientific and logical 
problem: the determination of the truth or falsity of the statements 
made in the indictment and the confessions. But they present also a 
political problem of the highest order, and when this is put to one 
side, we can~ot even begin to grasp their social and historical 
significance. 
The complacent hypocrites who signed the Open Letter attacking 
the movement to establish a Commission of Inquiry to hear the 
charges against Trotsky, "argued" that the Trials were a purely inter-
nal affair, and that Americans had no right to "interfere" in the 
affairs of ,the Soviet Union. It is hard to estimate the balance between 
blindness and hypocrisy expressed in such a view. No less a problem 
than that of the future of mankind is concentrated in the question of 
the Trials. They are no isolated phenomenon, nor one confined to 
Moscow. In the Soviet Union, through the Trials, Stalinism is physi-
cally exterminating the entire generation of Old Bolsheviks as a . 
necessary part of its destruction of the triumphs of the October -
Revolution which that generation led. In this way, the Soviet Union 
is being left increasingly helpless before the possibilities of capitalist 
restoration, possibilities which will be enormously heightened with 
the outbreak of the coming war. In Spain, the Stalinists, using the 
Trials as "justification," are attempting the suppression a-s "agents 
of Franco" of all those who in the Civil War call for the socialist 
revolution and who do not accept the perspective of defense of demo-
cratic capitalism. In this way, even a complete loyalist victory, 
bought with hundreds of thousands of lives, far from making pos-
sible the emancipation of the Spanish workers and peasants, will 
leave them straight-jacketed in the bonds of capitalist exploitation. 
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In th~ United States, as everywhere, under the slogan of "drive the 
Trotskyists out of the labor movement," once again "justified" and 
motivated by the Trials, the Stalinists are trying to isolate from the 
working class all those who refuse to accept their policies of class 
collaboration and popular frontism. 
The Radek-Piatakov Trial made far more explicit than the August 
Trial last Summer, the direction. of this whole process. The August 
charges of terrorism took second place to the new 'and emphasized 
charges against Radek, Piatakov, and the others-above all, of course, 
aga·inst Trotsky-of sabotage and especially of conspiracy with-
Germany and Japan. How clear the underlying political meaning 
becomes ! Yes: the Trials are an integral and outstanding part of 
the preparations of Stalinism for the coming war. Stalinism aims to 
enlist the masses in France, Great Britain and the United States in 
the armies of their own imperialist governments, in a holy war against 
the attack which Stalin expects to be launched against the Soviet 
Union by Germany 'and Japan. Through the Trials, operating on a 
world-wide scale, Stalinism thus attempts to eliminate every possible 
center of resistance to this social-patriotic betrayal. Through the 
Trials, Stalin speaks to the world, to the masses and to the demo-
cratic governments whose alliance he strives for: for all those who are 
against ,the war, the stand for the policies of revolutionary defeatism 
in all capitalist countries, are direct agents of Fascism and .the Fascist 
nations, ,and must be exterminated like mad dogs. 
This, in brief, is the meaning of the Trials. 
J AMES BURNHAM. 
April 151 1937. 
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Why Did They "Confess"? 
1. THE INDICTMENT 
ACCORDING to the verdict rendered by the Court on January 30, 1937, 
the defendants in the Radek-Piatakov trial were convicted of crimes 
committed on the direct order of "the enemy of the people"-
L. Trotsky. 
The following, according to the account of Marcel Cachin * in 
I'Humanite of February 15, 1937, are the crimes of the condemned 
men, crimes they themselves confessed. 
"1. We plotted secretly, in agreement with Trotsky, to kill the 
leaders ,of the Soviet state. We succeeded in a.ssassinating only one 
person, Ki·rov. We failed in the case of the others; but we had our' 
eye on all of them, starting with Stalin. 
"In fact, the corpse of the unfortun:ate Kirov is there to answer 
those who refuse to believe in their terroristic activities. 
"2. In agreement with Trotsky, we took advantage of our impor-
tant posts to sabotage the work of the five-yea.r plans;. we did not 
shrink from any crime in order to carry out our bloody work. 
"And, in point of fact, ,the corpses of hundreds of workers, engi-
neers and Red soldiers prove that these miserable curs went through 
with their criminal program. 
"3. We were determined to go even further. Our diabolic plan was 
not merely to sabotage construction but, failing to get any support 
from the Soviet masses in order to crush the power of the communists, 
we made connections with the heads of aggressor nations encircling 
the U.S.S.R., known enemies who are determined to make war for 
the purpose of destroying all the work of Lenin and Stalin." 
Terrorism, sabotage, and diversion, high treason and espionage-
this is how the court characterizes the acts committed by the 
defendants. 
• Cachin and Vaillant-Couturier (mentioned later on), leaders of the French 
Communist Party, were present at the Radek-Piatakov trial. The quotations 
cited from their articles written after their return to France were reproduced in 
this country in the Communist press, and are similar in content to the standard 
"official" estimate. [Tr.] 
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If a trial has any purpo§e, it is that of proving whether the indict-
ment brought by the public prosecutor, after preliminary examina-
tion, conforms to reality. Let us note in passing that even if 'a court 
conforms strictly to all the rules of juridical procedure, even if the 
selection of judges removes any suspicion of their partiality, judicial 
errors are not excluded. But with the check of a proper defense and 
public opinion, their probability is lessened. 
To admit, a priori, that a verdict is just, because it was handed 
down by a Soviet court, because the prisoners are political enemies, 
to admit this even before the verdict is rendered-as does the official 
communist press-is to admit the infallibility of Soviet justice, an 
admission the Soviet press itself will not substantiate, since it has 
often criticized Soviet justice in the past for its weaknesses and 
shortcomings. 
If this attitude is adopted, any discussion is useless. We wonder 
then what is the purpose of a public trial. Nikolayev, assassin of 
Kirov, and the sixteen convicted with him, were executed in Decem-· 
ber, 1934 following a secret trial, as were a hundred others whose 
crimes are not even known. As for the leaders of the C.P., and those 
who follow them blindly, the fact that the executions were ordered 
by the Soviet State suffices to prove the guilt of the victims. For 
them public trials are a needless luxury. 
Public trials in the U.S.S.R. aim to convince those for whom the 
word of Stalin is not the supreme criterion of truth. Therefore we 
have no right either to treat the sentence of the court as gospel, or to 
call those persO'ns "fascists" who, before m'aking up their minds, 
examine the record of the trial, and after such an examination, do 
not" share the views of the court. 
2. THE PROOFS 
"Everyone, with the exception of the' fascists and the Trotskyists," 
writes Cachin in l'Humanite of February 14, 1937, "admits the mate-
riality ' of the facts confessed by the ·accused." 
Let us look at these facts, according to Cachin's own account: 
1. The corpse oj Kirov. Yes, this is a material fact. But Kirov 
was assassinated by Nikolayev. TO' avenge this death, there were, 
besides Nikolayev, SGores of known executions (sixteen convicted with 
him, a hundred in December, 1934, sixteen in August, 1936). We' 
have no right to make use of thi! corp!e to declare men terrorists 
against whom no trace of evidence exists to prove that even in thought 
did they participate in the assassination of Kirov. 
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That Kirov is dead is a fact. It is also a fact that thirteen accused 
in the Piatakov trial were executed. But no man capable of reflection 
has found the slightest proof that the defendants in the Radek-Piata-
kov trial were implicated in Nikolayev's crime. 
2. There are hundreds of corpses of workers, engineers and Red 
soldiers, victims of disasters and accidents--of that there is no doubt. 
But to write that "no one would venture to doubt that the seventeen 
Trotskyists on trial were assassins, that these corpses prove that these 
miserable curs went through with their criminal program," is to 
substitute wishful thinking for reality. 
If tomorrow Hitler displays the corpses of a nwnber of Nazis and 
declares: here is the proof that they were assassinated by Thalmann; 
if the day after tomorrow, V1argas displ~ys the corpses of several 
Brazilian fasoists and declares: here is the proof of the terrorism of 
Car los Prestes, every honest worker will say: "Stop there! This is an 
infamous deception. On one side, we see corpses, on the other pris-
oners. It is up to you, prosecutor, to furnish the proof-not of the 
existence of assassinated men but of the guilt of the accused." In 
other words, when we speak of proofs, we mean material, circwn-
stantial evidence, docwnents, finger prints, trustworthy and reliable 
testimony, etc., etc .... the totality of which will show how the crime, 
of which the indicted are accused, wa~ perpetrated. (For the time 
being, we leave aside the confessions.) 
Does Cachin produce evidence of this kind .to estabLish that it was 
acts of sabotage and diversion which caused the death of scores of 
workers? No. Nor was anything of the sort presented at the tria.ls. 
3. Cachin and Vaillant-Couturier stress furthermore a third type 
of proof: they were present at the trial and heard the confessions. 
Their testimony on this point does prove one thing: the trial was 
held; the prisoners were there and confessed. But no one doubts 
this, and no one ever did doubt it. The testimony of Cachin and 
VaiHant-Couturier does not, and cannot, prove anything more, and 
it is worthless in establishing the guilt of the defendants. Except for 
emotions and subjective impressions, the reader of the court record 
knows as much about the trial as do the journalists and politicians 
who were there as spectators. 
But a perusal of .the court record (Report of Court Proceedings in 
the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre, published by the Peo-
ple's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1937) shows 
that no material proof exists. 
Only two proofs are even cited: 
a) Regarding Kniazev, head o(the Southern Railways, the indict-
ment reads: 
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"The accused Kniazev's treasonable communication with the Jap-
anese intelligence service has been established, not only by Kniazev's 
own testimony, but also by his correspondence .with Mr. H., found in 
his possession together with photographs, letters from Mr. H., one 
marked 12/15 and another of 8/23/36) ."* 
It is impossible to express an opinion on these proofs because they 
were scarcely mentioned at the public sessions of the court. In ·any 
case, Kniazev is a defendant of second rank, and there was nothing 
to prove ,that he carried out the alleged work of espionage on the 
order of ,the principal defendants, or of Trotsky. 
b) One other material proof consisted of a . notebook found on 
Stroilov, chief engineer of Kemerovo, candidate to the Executive Com-
mittee ,of the All-Russian Soviet, sentenced to eight years in prison. 
Following is the proof, summarized from the official Report of 
Court Proceedings (pages 270-279) : 
"At the request of the public prosecutor, a notebook containing the 
telephone number of von Berg in Moscow, at the time of his last 
residence in the Soviet Union, was shown to the defendant, Stroilov. 
Stroilov ·admitted that this notebook belonged to him and that he 
himself noted down the telephone number. 
"Vishinsky asked the court to add to this record the affidavit made 
by' the Hotel Savoy, proving that Berg, merchant under German juris-
diction, resided in said hotel from September 1st to the 15th. The 
telephone number recorded in Stroilov's notebook coincided with 
the one of von Berg's room. 
"At the request of .. Vishinsky, Stroilov was shown the photographs 
of twenty foreigners. Stroilov identified the photos of Wiister, Berg, 
Flessa and Schebesto. The COUlt established that the photos identified 
by Stroilov coincided with those contained in the files at the Foreign 
Department. The defendant, Shestov, pointed out, among the docu-
ments presented to him, the photos of ~less'a and Schebesto. The 
court established that the photos pointed out by Shestov also coin-
cided with those in the files in question." 
All this merely proves one thing: Stroilov knew the four German 
engineers who worked in Moscow (Wiister, Berg, Flessa and Sche-
besto); Shestov, who was executed, knew the last two. Further, 
Stroilov knew Berg's telephone number at the time of his residence 
in MQscow, as well as his Berlin telephone number. 
Now, according to the official account, Stroilov and Shestov lived 
a long time in Berlin, engaged in work for Soviet economic agencies. 
In the U.S.S.R. their work put them in touch with German engineers. 
Hence, the facts revealed to the court prove absolutely nothing as to 
• Report of Court Proceedings, p. ~4. 
8 
the guilt of the four German engineers, nor as to the guilt of Stroilov 
and Shestov. The fact of knowing German engineers, having rela-
tions with them, copying their ,telephone numbers-does this prove 
that one is a spy or that one entered into these relations for purposes 
of espionage? 
Even granting that Stroilov and Shestov were agents of the Ger-
man intelligence service, that does not yet prove that the other 
accused, and especi'ally Trotsky, knew or approved of ,this activity, 
or that they can be held in the least responsible for it. With much 
more reason, one could deduce that Ordjonikidze, People's Commis-
soar of Heavy Industry, direct superior of Stroilov and Shestov, and 
Stalin, master of the U.S.S.R., are responsible for the main crimes of 
these two defendants, because the connection between Stroilov, Shes-
tov and Ordjonikidze-Stalin is beyond ;a doubt. Accepting the line of 
reasoning followed by Vishinsky and Cachin, this is where we would 
be led. 
At the very most, material evidence exists in the cases of three out 
of seventeen defendants. As for the others, they speak of numerous 
letters from Trotsky which they quote from memory, all destroyed. 
We know of their existence only from the confessions of the accused. 
Hence, in the final analysis, everything is based on the confessions. If 
there had been no confessions, there would 'be no foundation under 
the trial; the whole structure of the indictment would crumble. 
When in his speech at the Velodrome d'Hiver, February 14, 1937, 
Cachln said: "All the prisoner-s admitted, since the documents and 
proofs were there before them, their link, through espionage and 
bribery, with the agents of Hitler and Japan," we are face to face with 
an obvious f.alsehood. N one of these documents or material proofs 
were pr,oducedat the trial. 
3. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFESSIONS 
Thus, inquiry into the trial reduces itself to a critical examination 
of the depositions of the accused and witnesses (the witnesses sum-
moned to the stand were all accused of the same crimes as the 
defendants, they were all arrested; they ought to have heen in the 
prisoners' dock with the same status as . the seventeen prisoners). 
We leave aside what is self-ev:ident from -a first reading of the 
proceedings of the trial: the implausibility of the confessions. For 
example, to carry out the railway accidents (Lifshitz, a defend1ant, 
told of 3,500 accidents organized by himself), the heads of the Com-
missariat of Railways present in the dock, wlio did not. work. directly 
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on trains or in station!, .would have needed at their disposal a vast 
oonspiratorial organization numbering thousands of operatives. 
Such an organization would have had to carryon for years without 
being found out. If this were the case, we might well ask what the 
Soviet police and the Commissariat of the Interior* are worth. 
We leave aside this criticism because the implausible is not the 
impossible. The opposite hypothesis: the confessions are f'alse, the 
trial is a frame-up, is at first glance as little plausible as the first 
hypothesis. It is so monstrous th·at we have an inclination to reject 
it a priori. 
But we must choose between the two: either we have to believe the 
accused, in spite of the implausibility of their stories, or, on the 
other hand, they do not deserve credence, the confessions are false, 
and the trial is therefore a frame-up. An examination of the concrete 
facts at our disposal is the only way to arrive ,at a valid judgment. 
Did the accused tell the truth? When we say the accused, we have 
in mind those who were tried publicly, the seventeen, whose accounts 
are part of the same story 'and form chapters of a major work-
the indictment. 
But there were other prisoners. What did they say? About this, 
nothing is kD.own because the defendants were selected. We wrote on 
this subject in No.5 of the Drapeau Rouge, February 5, 1937: 
"The present tri'al was held following two trials of Zinoviev, Kam-
enev and their friends: one on January 15, 1935, and another on 
August 23, 1936. The indictments in these two trials declared that 
the cases of a certain number of defendants 'were held up because 
they were still under investigation.' At the time of the trial in August, 
1936, the names of twelve accused were mentioned 'as 'held in reserve.' 
Not one of them figured in the present trial. Why? Let us remember 
that among them was Gavin, who w'as alleged to have aoted as inter-
mediary between Trotsky and the defendants: the terrorists Schmidt, 
Esterman, etc. . . . 
"From 'the very opening of the trial, defendants mentioned dozens 
of new 'accomplices' in whom no one seemed to take the least interest. 
For example, Piatakov alone mentioned eighteen names of 'accom-
plices.' Whole groups of criminals were mentioned, but they were 
absent from the prisoners' dock, just like the twelve 'held in reserve,' 
just like the hundreds of other 'Trotskyists' arrested in 1935 and 1936. 
"Either the investigation which disclosed the Trotskyist plot is 
finished-and in that case all the participants ought to figure in the 
trial-or, on the other hand, the in vest ig·ati on is not finished. And in 
*The functioning of the G.P.D. is now carried on through the Commissariat of 
the Interior. [Tr.] 
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that case, what right had they to select seventeen individuals in such 
arbitrary f,ashion? . 
"The fact that seventeen prisoners were chosen from a much longer 
list can be demonstrated by a simple device, already used by Sedov 
f or the Zinoviev trial (see Livre Rouge sur Ie proces de M oscou, 
page 53). 
"The dossier of every prisoner is numbered. These numbers follow 
one another consecutively. If we arrange the ten defendants whose 
depositions figure in the indictment in the order of the numbers on 
their dossiers, we get the following table: 
Piatakov 1 Drohnis 13 
Radek 5 Shestov 15 
Sokolnikov 8 Pushin 19 
Arnold 36 
Hrasche 
Turok 
Kniazev 
21 
23 
32 
"So that for seventeen defendants there were at least 36 dossiers. 
Where are the nineteen of the other dossiers? 
"How much importance should we assign to this selection? An 
enormous importance. If we see in the prisoners' dock only ,th·ose 
who confessed, we have a right to infer that those who refused to 
confess will never be brought to a public trial. Therefore suspicion 
inevitably hovers over those who were considered 'worthy' of par-
ticipation in a public trial." 
This ~uspicion can only be augmented by an analysis of the sin-
cerity of the defendants. Just imagine that someone makes an accusa-
tion against you. If the accuser is known as a liar, a professional 
slanderer, a person leading -a double life, his accusation is worth-
less; his testimony is rejected in advance. We have no right to lend 
the least credence to his statements. Before -believing the confessions, 
we must see if those who confess are worthy of trust. 
F or years the principal defendants swore that they had broken 
definitely with Trotsky and the Opposition, and swore loyalty Ito 
Stalin. On August 21, 1936, Radek and Piatakov published blood-
thirsty !articles in the Soviet press against Zinoviev, Kamenev and 
their colleagues, 'and against Trotsky. Piatakov sang hymns of glory 
to the G.P.V. wliich had exposed the gang of Zinovievists. 
Further, according to Pravda of January 25, 1937, Piatakov was 
alleged to have expressed orally in August a desire to intervene as 
accuser 'at the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, and if that was found impos-
sible, to carry out the sentence of the court against them. 
Thus, if the contention of the prosecution were .true, we would he 
dealing with a case of monstrous duplicity: members of the same 
organiz'ation shooting each other • . • in order to hide their game. 
Once arrested, the accused persisted in denying any part in the 
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plot. Muralov held out for eight months. Radek, arrested in Septem-
ber, did not begin to "confess" until three months later. 
Why must we believe what Radek says a£ter December 4, 1936, 
and disbelieve everything he said or wrote from 1929 to December 
4, 1936, during which time he denied any connection with Trotsky 
and the Trotskyists? The confessions of men who make systematic 
lying a rule of conduct cannot be accepted as a criterion of th~ truth. 
The spuriousness of the confessions can be demonstrated more 
directly. In general, the confessions a-re so indefinite that no check-up 
is possible. Moreover, it is impossible, for example, to verify whether 
Sokolnikov had a private convers'ation with the Japanese ambassador, 
in order to betray the U.S.S.R., or whether Radek plotted-privately 
-with the German military attache, etc. But in Piatakov's deposi-
tion, there happens to be 'a circumstantial accoun.t. He tells how, in 
the' first half of D'ecember, he took a Germ1an plane at the Tempel-
hof airport in Berlin and flew to Oslo with a false passport. At Oslo, 
he had -an interview with Trotsky. 
An official check-up m'ade in Oslo showed that not a single foreign 
plane arrived at the Oslo airport in December, 1935 (le Temps, Jan-
uary 30, 1937). Thus Piatakov's story is untrue on this point, as 
untrue -as the story told by HoI.tzmann (also executed), -at t4e Zino-
viev trial, of meeting Sedov in Copenhagen ' in 1932 at the Hotel Bris-
tol. It was proved that this hotel had not been in existence since 
1917 .•.• 
Both Piatakov's and Holtzmann's stories are of the greatest impor-
tance in the mechanism of the trials. They have as their -aim the 
establishment of the link between the ·accusedand Trotsky. We have 
seen that on this fundamental point the statements of ·the ,accused 
have heen inven.ted 'out of whole cloth, that we are dealing here with 
a falsehood of clas~ic proportions. .' 
4. A JUDICIAL FRAME-UP , 
If we have shown that Piatakov or Radek persisted in lying at the 
examination, and even ,at the trial, of what value are their . deposi-
tions and those of their co-defendants, who admitted the most fan-
tastic and implausible crimes without their bringing forward the 
slightest proof, or the court attempting even the most elementary 
check-up? 
When we take into consideration the fact that we have a case of 
~alse confessions, the arbitrary selection of defendan~s becomes 
understandable. Those were chosen who agr.eed -to give false testi-
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mony useful to the regime; those who refused to be a part of this 
sinister parody were sentenced secretly. 
In his summary, the pr'osecutor himself admitted that the accused 
did not tell the truth, that we must not believe them, that they are 
liars :and cheats: 
"I think ,that :all these circumstances enable me to say that if there 
is 'any shortcoming in the present trial, it is not that the accused 
have said what they have done, but that, after ,all, the accused have 
not really told us all they have done, all the crimes they have com-
mitted against the Soviet State. 
"But, Comrade Judges, we had an example of this in previous 
trials and I ask you to hear this in mind when we hear the last pleas 
that will be made here in a few hours' time. I would like to remind 
you of how, in the case of the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite center say, 
certain of the accused vowed, right here, in this very dock, during 
their last pleas, some begging, others not begging for clemency, that 
they have spoken the. whole truth, that they have said everything, that 
in their hearts no opposition whatever remained against the working 
class, ,against our people, against our country. And later, when the 
revolting skein of monstrous crimes committed by these people 
became more and more unravelled, we found that at every step these 
. people bad lied ·and deceived when they already had one foot in 
the grave. 
"If we are to speak of shortQomings of. the present trial, I see 
only one defect: I ·am convinced that the accused have not said half 
the truth which constitutes the horrible tale of the awful crimes they 
committed against our country, against our great motherland! ". 
Let us note in p·assing the "indiscretion" of the prosecutor who, by 
this 'accusation of lying and dece~ving, destroys the value of the 
confessions on which the whole edifice of the indictment rests. For, 
liars and deceivers d'o not merit 'any confidence. Why must we believe 
that what they said was true, when .they persisted in denying half of 
·their crimes -(that is to say, they continued to lie). 
The prosecutor was forced to pose the problem of "false con-
'fessions": 
"But let us assume that the· testimony of the accused cannot serve 
as convincing proof. In that case it is necessary to reply to certain 
questions as the science of criminal procedure demands. If the state-
ments do not conform with the truth, it is what is called in science, 
a denunciation. And if it is a denunciation, the reasons for it must be 
explai~d. There may be different reasons for it. The existence oj 
• Report of Court Proceedings, p. 514. 
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these reasons must be proved. It might be the · pursuit of personal 
advantage, personal interest, a desire to take revenge on someone, 
and so forth. . . . 
"The circumstances of the present case, which have heen examined 
here with all possible care, convincingly confirm what the accused 
have said. There is no reason to assume that Piatakov is not a mem-
ber of the center, that Radek w'as not present at the diplomatic recep-
tions and did not speak with Mr. K., or with Mr. H., or with any 
other gentleman-whatever his name may be; that he and Bukharin 
did not treat certain persons who came to visit him unofficially to 
'fried eggs and sausage,' that Sokolnikov did not speak to some 
representa~ive or other, thus 'putting a visa on Trotsky's mandate.' 
All that they said about their activities has been verified by the evi-
dence of the experts, by the preliminary interrogation, by confessions 
and testimony, and none of this can be subject to any doubt 
whatever."· 
The declaration of the prosecutor that "we have (besides the con-
fessions) a number of documents" and that "all that they said about 
their activities has heen verified by the evidence of the experts and 
by tke preliminary interrogation" is a v,ain boast, in contradiction 
with ·the facts. 
The documents? We know that there were none. The report of 
experts? We wonder how "experts" can prove the meetings of the 
accused with Trotsky or with German diplomats. As for industrial 
accidents, expert opinion might, under certain circumstances, show 
that these were brought about malicio·usly. But how can the report 
of experts prove that ,the order for this malicious ·act emanated from 
one of the accused, from a leader who was often thousands of miles 
away from the wreck? 
Finally, the premilinary examinations. If the accusations were 
true, we would have to conclude that the police and the soviet judici-
ary are unqualified and in~pable of establishing anything whatever 
except by "confessions." 
Let us recall: Zinoviev, K,amenev and their friends were arrested 
in December, 1934. The first interrogation established no legal 
responsibility. The second interrogation proved· their moral respon-
sibility in the assassination of Kirov. A third interrogation was nec-
essary, in the sunimer of 1936, to prove their direct responsibility; 
hut they still did not disclose their program nor ,their 'acts of sabotage, 
nor their connection with Radek, Piatakov, etc. Zinoviev and Kam-
*lbid., pp. 513-514. 
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enev had to denounce these latter during the August trial before they 
were involved. 
The accused at the August trial likewise denounced Bukharin and 
Rykov. An inquiry opened. It ended September lOth, with no 
grounds for indictment. A week before ·the Radek trial, Bukh,arin was 
still editor-in.chief of Izvestia. Today his guilt is affirmed by the 
authorities. What. new facts were introduced after September 10th 
~hich were unknown ( why?) to the first inquiry? What does this 
alleged interrogation consist of? If we are to judge by the past, it 
must consist merely of the recording of the depositions of the 
accused. 
We return therefore to the point of departure: the confessions. 
There is nothing else; they are the alpha and the omega of the trials. 
Let us follow the reasoning of the prosecutor with reference to 
them: we see no motive why .the accused should have lied; therefore 
they told the truth. There is no reason to imagine that Piatakov was 
not a member of the center, etc .... ; therefore he is a member of 
the center. 
This is a model of sophistic reasoning, impermissible to anyone 
seeking the truth. There is a very easy rebuttal. We see no motive why 
the accused should have told the truth; therefore they lied. There is 
no re'ason to imagine that Trotsky was engaged in espionage, sabo-
tage, etc .... ; therefore ,the charge is false. 
It is up to the accusers to bring forward the proofs, and not logical 
or psychological pseudo-analyses built out of a vacuWD, analyses 
whose demonstrative value is zero. Even if the statements of the 
accused were more plausible than is the case; even if there had not 
been the arbitrary selection, nor Piatakov's imaginary journey to 
Oslo, a court composed of men independent ot the executive power, 
letting themselves be guided only by common sense, would have had 
to' acquit the accused for lack of evidence. 
As to the Piatakov episode, which shows the falseness of one of 
the principal supports of the indictment (the link of Piatakov with 
Trotsky) , the acquittal would have to be followed by '8 charge ag,ainst 
Piatakov for perjury, and above all by the immediate removal from 
office of these singular judges who did not even trouble to verify this 
fantastic story. 
Conviction of the accused on the sole basis of their stories, in 
which we have nQ right to believe, constitutes a juridical monstrosity, 
one of the greatest judicial scandals of history. The role of inter-
rogations and of court sessions is to prove the guilt of the accused. 
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It is only in doubtful cases that a decision should be left completely 
to the bench. Here, there were no doubtful cases. Seldom has the 
inconsistency of an indictment been so flagrant and brought out so 
clearly in the hearings themselves. 
'The stage managers did not bother to compose a coherent piece 
when constructing the history of the ' discovery of the· plot. And to 
know how the authorities were led to unearth the plot is , of capital 
importance in any trial of this type. We ,are confronted with a 
dilemma: Either the police made use of agents provocateurs, mem-
bers of a terrorist organization-and if so, why did they do nothing 
to prevent the accidents, the attempts at assassination, espionage, 
etc., catching ,the accused red-handed in transmission of orders, the 
illegal purchase of arms, etc. (which would have constituted a gen-
uine proof)? Or, on the other hand, the police discovered the 
existence of the plot in some other manner. In that case, perhaps 
they wished to protect the informers, but then, they would have to 
explain how they themselves became convinced of the truth of the 
information. Did they do so by arrestiDg all those informed against, 
and waiting until they confessed? What guarantees do we have, in 
such a case, even if the accused were not subjected to physical tor-
ture, that after "a prison cure" their stories would be true? 
Let us place ourselves on the same ground chosen by the prosecu-
tor. Let us suppose that there is no real motive for the defendants 
accusing themselves of the worst of crimes. The key to the trial is 
nevertheless the statements of the co-defendants, the accusations 
brought against Trotsky. But far from confessing, Trotsky cate-
goricall y denies everything. 
Why then believe the stories of the accused-"these deceivers and 
liars" (Vishinsky dixit!}-so far as they concern Trotsky? With 
reference to him, a pl,ausible motive does exist for a f.alse accusation, 
namely the desire to be revenged on someone. No one doubts that at 
the moment when they accused Trotsky, the accused were inspired by 
a feeling of hatred for him. That part of the depositions concerning 
Trotsky constitutes a classic example of "informing against an 
accomplice," and the court would have had, in any case, to consider 
Trotsky as not implicated-if it had acted like a court and not like 
a mere executor of orders received from above. 
One can examine the trial from the most diverse aspects; the 
conclusion is always the same: we are confronted with a frame-up 
covering the political manreuvre of "purging" a part of the old 
cadres of the Bolshevik party. 
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5. FALSE THEORIES 
For all that, one disturbing fact remains: why did the accused 
confess? How do you explain this phenomenon? 
Let us note, contrary to what the prosecutor says, that it is 
impossible 'to explain the confessions if we accept them as true. 
The first . theory, upheld by l'Oeuvre and le Merle Blanc, etc. in 
France, is as follows: they confessed because it is true. Nothing could 
be simpler. But then we must suppose that the defendants are moti-
vated by an inordinate love of the truth, ready to offer their lives 
on its altar. Does not their entire past contradict this supposition? 
If we place the articles which Piatakov and Radek wrote on Septem-
ber 21, 1936 (in which they denied any collabor,ation with Trotsky 
after 1928-29) alongside .their depositions 'at the trial, is not this 
theory destroyed? 
Besides, in his last plea, Radek declared-and he is in agreement 
here with the public indictment-that he did not make his full con-
fession "from love of the truth in general." 
Then comes the official thesis expressed most completely in the 
article of D. Ossipov published in Pravda January 27, 1937, under 
the title: "Why do they confess?" 
"The accused admit what has .already heen discovered by the 
investigrating bodies of the People's Commissariat of the Interior 
and the public prosecutor. The accusation is based strictly on facts. 
The criminal is convinced that his role in the counter-revolutionary 
organization is known .... The accused are overwhelmed in the first 
place by the weight of incontestable evidence. It is mad to deny their 
guilt in the face of the evidence. Denial would, under these condi-
tions, only confirm their guilt. It would place the accused, in the 
court, in a painful and ridiculous situation. 
" ••• But sincere acknowledgment of the facts established in the 
investigation does not at all signify complete and honest sincerity. 
"At the ·first Kirov murder trial,. Kamenev 'and Zinoviev, with 'all 
sincerity;' admitted their political and moral responsibility for the 
assassination, but hid the existence of a united Trotskyist-Zinovievist 
center directing the terror. When the examining bodies unmasked this 
center as well, Kamenev and Zinoviev were already in the prisoners' 
dock as direct and immediate organizerrs of the Kirov assassination. 
Again, with all 'sincerity,' they admitted their guilt which it was 
already impossible to deny. But they hid the existe~ce of the 'parallel 
center' and the clandestine· organization, supposing that the agencies 
of the People's Commissariat of the Interior were not yet on the 
criminal trail." 
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This theory is in contradiction with the facts. We have seen that 
the confessions, far from corroborating the facts established by other 
means, serve as the sole basis for the indictment. If this theory were 
true, why should Radek and Sokolnikov have confessed their private 
conversations with foreign diplomats, Piatakov his alleged conversa-
tion with Trotsky, Radek the contents of letters from Trotsky, etc ... ? 
Except for their "confessions," nothing could reveal the existence of 
these facts. "The overwhelming weight of the evidence" exists only 
in the imagination of Vi shinsky and the Soviet journalists. 
Vaillant-Couturier senses the weakness of these two theories; he 
has recourse to a third, more plausible theory: 
"The accused were cowards, but they were prisoners of the con~ 
spiracy. When they were arrested, they saw the war, the abyss that 
they were preparing, and then the better side of their nature awake. 
ened: that is the secret of their confessions." (L'Humanite, February 
15, 1937.) 
Radek, in his last plea, refutes this thesis: 
"I have admitted my guilt and I have given full testimony con ... 
cerning it, not from the simple necessity of repentance-repentance 
may be an internal state of mind which one need not necessarily 
share with or reveal to anybody."* 
But let us examine in greater detail this hypothesis. Here are 
political men of the first rank, having behind them decades of politi-
cal struggle, having participated-,in the most responsible posts-in 
the revolution, the civil war, and the direction of the State. ·These 
men, if we believe the indictment, had been participating since 1931 
in a conspiratorial counter-revolutionary plot, while all the time 
proclaiming their fidelity to the regime. They become aware of what 
they are doing-nobody casts any doubt on their great intellectual 
capacity. They know what awaits them-Zinoviev and Kamenev were 
arrested in Decem'ber, 1934, Smirnov in 1933-they are the ones who 
direct in the Soviet press the campaign of agitation for the murder 
of their "accomplices." Anyone of them could denounce the plot to 
the G.P.U. if he thought it useful. They do not do so, for they are 
"enemies of the people." 
They are then "the hardest of the hard." They are arrested, and 
then after ,three months of imprisonment Karl Radek, one of the 
greatest leaders of the international working class movement, sudden-
ly "repents," from Trotskyist he becomes Stalinist, and denounces 
Trotsky, and his friends. Muralov, "Trotsky's closest follower, of 
whom r was convinced ,that he would rather perish in prison (sic!) 
* Report 0/ Court Proceedings, p. 542. 
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than say a single word," (last plea of Radek*) "repents" eight 
months after his arrest, becomes anti-Trotskyist and Stalinist. The 
others manifested their repentance after longer or shorter stays 
in prison. 
What was then the motive that urged them to this sudden conver-
sion, to this 180 degree turn in their political positions-if one is to 
believe the indictment? What are the facts that make it possible to 
believe that we are faced with "sincere repentance"? Here, moreover, 
V·aillant-Couturier comes into contradiction with the prosecutor, who 
remains skeptical regarding "the awakening of their better nature." 
To explain the Trotskyism "of the enemies of the people," the 
prosecutor makes long excursions into history; the accused, if one 
takes seriously his historical recolIec·tions, were never revolutionists; 
they were always enemies of the proletariat. Thus, their crimes of 
1931-1935 flowed from their past, were prepared by their past. 
But "their conversion" in prison has no 'antecedent; it falls from 
heaven like a thunder-holt. Is it due to the ~iraculous virtues of 
Soviet prison air? To the methods of the examination? To torture? 
Confessions obtained by torture are null and void. That is the 
A.B.C. of the science of criminal procedure. The accused declare 
that they have not been subjected to any torture; nothing permits us 
to affirm the contrary. On the one hand, it is improbable that torture 
could break men of the temper of Piatakov, Radek, Muralov, etc .•.. 
On the other hand, if the accused had remained Trotskyists in the 
bottom of their hearts, they would have denounced such methods at 
the trials. 
The .thesis ()f "conversion" presupposes a premise that most of 
the accused hring forward: already, before our arrests, they say, we 
had doubts as to the correctness of the road chosen, but "we were 
prisoners of the conspiracy." Now these doubts could not arise sud-
denly a few months before the arrests. With people of this temper, 
doubts could be only the expression of an internal conflict, of a 
political duality, of the heterogeneity of their political attitudes, of 
the coexistence in their minds for years "of the good and the bad." 
This conception, which bI-dIgs us closer to the truth, deals a mortal 
blow to the thesis of the indictment. For the crimes imputed to the 
accused, the monstrous duplicity which they would prove, require 
such a tension of the nerves, such an attachment to their ideas, such 
fanaticism that they exclude any attitude of doubt, any hesitation. 
We are acquainted in history with political fighters who, to destroy 
an enemy, penetrate his camp, don his uniform, occupy exalted posts; 
·Ibid., p. 551. 
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we knQW hQW these peQple cQmpQrt themselves Qnce they are 
unmasked. These peQple have one , CQmmQn trait: great firmness of 
character, an unshakeable faith in their cause., These peQple can be 
killed, htlt it is impQssible to. transfQrm them into puppets, repeating 
the litany at the trial after the prQsecuting attQrney. PrQQfs mQre 
PQwerful are needed to. make us believe that first-class co.nspiratQrs, 
who. have actually succeeded in keeping the cQ~try under their PQwer 
fQr years, while instigating ,at ple'asure catastrQphes, wrecks, and 
attempts at assassinatiQn, were brQken after a few days, a few weeks, 
Q,r a few mQnths of imprisQnment. 
6. WHY DID THEY CONFESS? 
No., fQr a IQng time the accused had been neither TrQtskyists nQr 
cQnspirators. Their real histQry, excluding mystery stQries in the 
style Qf Vishinsky, is sufficien~ for us to. underst~nd why they could 
fall so. IQW ,as to. make _false depQsitiQns ~t the trial. , , 
FQrmer OppositiQnists, adversaries o( ~talin from 1923 to '1927, 
they capitulated and renounced the struggle against him between the 
end of 1927 and 1929. Why? They explain it clearly in the declara-
tions they made at the very beginning of their capitulatiQn-on 
December, 1927-declarations' made 'freely and not after a sojQurn 
in prisQn. At that moment the questiQn of expelling the Opposition 
was 'being posed at the Fifteenth Congress o.f 'the Bolsheyik Party. 
(Trotsky and ZinQviev had already been expelled.) Kamenev, spokes-
man Qf the OpPQsition, shows in his speech the impasse reached by 
the Opposition: 
"We have to. choQse between two. roads. One of these rQads is that 
of a second party. That road, under the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat, is fatal for the revolution. It is the rQad of political degenera-
tion and class deviation. This rQad 'is clQsed to. us, forbidden by the 
whQle system of our ideas, by all the . teachings Qf Lenin on the 
dictatQrship Qf the prQletariat. We do. not wish to. take this rQad and 
we do not wish to. lead onto. it the cQmrades of' our tendency. 
"There remains, consequently, the second rQad. This rQad means . 
. . . that we submit cQmpletely to. the party. We choose that rQad, for 
we are profQundly convinced Qf the fact thai a CQrrect Leninist policy 
can he realised Qnly inside our party, ,and not outside the party and 
against it .... But if in additiQn we have , to. renQUnce Qur point of 
view (which is what the CQngress' demands), that would ' riQt be, in 
Qur Qpinion,' Bolshevik. This demand for the renunciation of one's 
Qwn opinions has never been posed in our party. If a renunciation 
Qn our part of the opiniQns which we defended only a week ~r two 
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ago should-be brought about, it would be hypocrisy, and we would 
not have your confidence. If I came to tell you here: I renounce what 
I published in my theses a fortnight ago-you would not believe it; 
it would be pure hypocrisy on my part. N ow such hypocrisy is not 
fitting here; it would merely introduce decay into the very founda-
tions of the reconciliation (of the Opposition with the party). . ~ • 
To demand of us the renunciation of our opinions is inadmissible 
and impossible to execute." (JSe Congres du C.P.U.S.S.R., Bureau 
d'Editions, pp. 117-120.) 
Kamenev here demonstrates in advance the absurdity of "conver-
sion," of changing ideas at the order of the party. The Congress was 
not convinced by Kamenev, and on December 19, 1927, ordered the 
expulsion of the active members of the Opposition, demanding of 
them "complete ideological disarmament, the firm condemnation of 
the opinions of the Opposition as being anti-Leninist and Menshevist." 
The next day, twenty-three Zinovievists, Zinoviev and Kamenev at 
their head, handed the Prresidium of the Congress a statement that 
throws a harsh light on this sin.gular, unique mechanism of self-
critical declarations and the confession of uncommitted crimes. 
"Neither outside the C.P.U.S.S.R. nor by organizing a second 
party, can we serve the cause that we served under the leadership of 
Lenin for years and decades. We can serve it only in the ranks of 
the C.P.U.S.S.R. Now the Congress has expelled us f~om the 
C.P.U.S.S.R. Consequently, harsh as may be for us the demands of 
the Congress, whatever conviction we may have brought to defend 
our ideas before the Congress, we are obliged to submit our will and 
our ideas to the will and the ideas of the party, for it is the sole 
leader of the proletarian revolution and the sole supreme judge of 
what is of use or of .}wrm to the victorious progress of the 
revo lutian." 
The twenty-three, "disarmed ideologically," proclaimed as false 
and condemned, "in conformity with the resolution of the Congress," 
all the ideas that they defended on the very eve of the Congress and 
in the Congress itself. Th~y ended by asking the Congress to readmit 
them into the party. 
This document, compared with the speech of Kamenev, indicates 
the road that the "capitulators" were entering, the road that led them 
to the prisoners' dock and before the firing squad. They forewarned 
the Congress that they could not in their hearts renounce their 
opinions but, on the demand of the Congress, -they agreed to don the 
mask of hypocrisy to serve :the party. Everything the party wishes 
is good, "for it is the supreme judge of what is of use or of harm to 
the victorious progress of the revolution." 
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Compare with this statement the explanation Radek gives for his 
confessions: 
"I must admit my guilt from motives of the general benefit that 
this truth must bring. "* 
Benefit of the truth .... But who is the judge of that benefit? The 
party and it alone, as the statement of 1927 explains. 
The truth is what benefits the party, what 'benefits Stalin-what 
the party demands, what Stalin demands. That is the attitude adopted 
by the former Oppositionists who renounced independent political 
activity and their ideas. The confessions they made during the trials 
flow from the same mentality, the same attitude as their statements 
of 1927, as all the declarations of repentance that followed them. 
In 1927, the party demanded of them, in the interest of the revo-
lution, that they sacrifice their ideas, their program, the thing that is 
dearest to every revolutionist. They did so, for the orders of the 
party are above 'all else. Their attitude towards the party recalls the 
attitude of the believer towards his God: All that God wishes, all that 
God requires, is good; it must be performed, without grumbling, 
without discussing the will of God-in this instance, the will of 
Stalin. 
Hence, when in 1936, the leadership of the party judged it neces-
sary, in the alleged interest of the revolution, to deal a blow to 
Trotskyism and to Trotsky, when it decided to utilize for this end the 
former Oppositionists, the former Trotskyists, what could they 
oppose to the orders of the party, to the will of Stalin? After the 
sacrifice of their ideas, they were required to sacrifice their lives and 
their honor. This was needed for the defense of the U.S.S.R. Trotsky-
ism is the principal danger, for in case of war, it might create diffi-
culties, turn the workers away from their duty to the party, or profit 
by the circumstances to substitute for the government of Stalin another 
government. It is thus that the party leadership reasons; it demands 
from the "capitulators"-its hostages-this last service: participate 
in the execution of Trotskyism. Through their permanent capitula-
tions of the past ten years, the former Oppositionists are all destined 
to play this last comedy, to forge this last link in the chain of 
hypocrisy that for years has constituted their lives. 
There are some who, in spite of their weaknesses in the past, do 
not go along with the amalgam, who revolt, with a last exertion of 
will, on seeing the gulf to which their policies have driven them. 
Well, they will have time in prison for reflection, for proving whether 
their devotion to the party of which they talk so much will not turn 
• Report 0/ Court Proceedings, p. 542. 
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out to be more powerful than "petty-bourgeois scruples." Those who 
agree to render this supreme service to the regime, which for them 
continues to be the regime of the proletarian revolution, will be the 
ones to appear at the public trial. They will 'be there under discipline, 
as members of the Co.mmunist party. 
We are confronted, not with a trial in the proper sense o.f the 
term, but with a vast meeting, where the prosecuting attorney and the 
defendants deliver pro.paganda speeches and together make an assault 
on Trotsky and Tro.tskyism. In his last plea, Radek explains the 
reasons for his attitude at the trial, the go.al he sets for himself (it 
can be applied equally to. the other accused). 
"I am not fighting for my honor, which 1 have lost. I am fighting 
f or the reco.gnitio.n of the truth of the testimony 1 have given, the 
truth in the eyes no.t o.f this co.urt, no.t o.f the Public Prosecutor and 
the judges, who. know us stripped to. the so.ul, but o.f the far wider 
circle o.f peo.ple who hav~ kno.wn me for thirty years."* 
He specifies later the circle of which he is speaking: 
"There are in the country semi-Trotskyites, quarter-Trotskyites, 
o.ne-eighth Trotskyites,. people who helped us, no.t knowing of the 
terro.rist organization ... we say to these elements: whoever has the 
slightest rift with the party, let him realize that tomo.rrow he may be 
a diversionist, tomo.rrow he may be a traitor, if he does not thoroughly 
heal that rift by complete and utter frankness to the party. 
"Secondly, we must say to the Trotskyite element in France, Spain 
and other countries-there ·are such-that the experience o.f the Rus-
sian revolution has shown that Tro.tskyism is a wrecker of the labor 
movement .... And finally we must say to the whole world, to all 
who. are struggling for peace: Tro.tskyism is the instrument of the 
war-mongers."· * 
Would a spy, a traitor, a wrecker give such lessons? Co.uld a poor 
repentant sinner speak such language? No. This language is the 
language of a Stalinist who., perhaps, deep within him, ,preserves so.me 
do.ubts and heretical ideas; who in an intimate conversation with a 
friend of old days perhaps expresses his scorn of the new masters, 
of the new upstarts, but who is first of all a tool in the hands of 
Stalin, a docile and malleable tool. 
Why, under such conditions, are they sentenced, are they shot? 
Why this monstrous trial directed against people who have not com-
mitted the crimes imputed to them? We · have tried to explain the 
political causes of the Zinoviev trial in No. 22 of Que faire? (Octo-
ber, 1936. A. Martin: "Pourquoi Ie proces Zinoviev?-Le chemin de 
* I bid., pp. 543-544. * • I bid., p. 550. 
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• 
la revolution russe.") * The Piatakov-Radek trial constitutes the sec-
ond act of the same drama; it is the logical sequel to the Zinoviev 
trial. 
Given the present tension of social relations in the U.S.S.R., as 
well as that between the U.S.S.R. and the fascist Holy Alliance, there 
is' no room in the Stalinist U.S.S.R. for people who a.re not in hun-
dred percent agreement ' with the regime. The former Oppositionists, 
in spite of all their capitulations, remain suspect in the eyes of the 
new masters of the State handpicked by Stalin, who are strangers to 
all the traditions of the revolution. In their hearts, the former 
Oppositionists cannot help hating, cannot help despising those who 
have reduced them to their lamentable puppet existence. If the situa-
tion became really dangerous for the clique today holding the reins 
of power, who knows but what the' Old Bolsheviks might become 
the center of crystallization for the' discontented workers; but what 
they might become that substitute team whose specter haunts the 
profiteers of the revolution? 
They must be done away with. The methods 1?y which the Old 
Guard is liquidated are worthy of a Torquemada or a Hitler. The 
Russian revolution must be very sick for its present masters to seek 
their inspiration and their models in the dregs of humanity. 
7. WHO ARE "THE ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE"? 
Under this title, the Courrie-r Socialiste (No.3, February 11, 1937) 
published the following note: 
"One trial follows another. The circle of 'spies,' 'diversionists,' 
'terrorists,' 'traitors,' is constantly enlarged. Their crimes have their 
roots, it is claimed, in the distant past. Ten to twenty years ago, these 
people are supposed to have taken the road of betrayal-at the very 
beginning of the revolution. 
"Who are these , 'enemies of the people'? 
"The Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party took place in July 
and August, 1917. It named a Central Committe of twenty-one mem-
bers. Seven have long been dead; six of the fourteen remaining have 
abandoned active political life, becoming ordinary functionaries 
(perhaps some have died). There remain eight-seven 'counter-revo-
h~.tionists' (Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Smilga, Sokol-
nikov, Trotsky) and Stalin. ' , , 
"March, 1918, at the Seventh Congre~s of the Party the Central 
Committee had fifteen members. Six have long been dead; two have 
*See also Max Shachtman: Behind the Moscow Trial. [Tr.] 
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ceased all political activity. There remain seven-six 'count.er-revo-
lutionists' (Bukharin, Zinoviev, Smilga, Sokolnikov, Trotsky, 
Schmidt) and Stalin. 
"March, 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the party the Central 
Committee had nineteen members. Three are de~d; three have given 
up all political life. There remain thirteen, of whom eleven are 
'counter-revolutionists' (Bukharin, Beloborodov, Yevdokimov, Zino-
viev, Kamenev, Radek, Rakovsky, Serebriakov, Smilga, Tomsky, 
Trotsky) and Stalin with Kalinin (who managed to obliterate in 
time his 'counter-revolutionary' tracks). 
"March and April, 1920, at the Ninth Congress of the Party, there 
were again nineteen members of the Central Committee. Three are 
dead; two have given 'up all political activity. Fourteen remain-
eleven 'counter-revolutionists' (Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Preo-
brazhensky, Radek, Rakovsky, Rykov, Serebriakov, 1. N. Smirnov, 
Tomsky, Trotsky) and Stalin, Kalinin and Andreyev. 
"This enumeration could be prolonged. It is not worth while .... 
I wish to add a little supplementary information: 
"The Seventh Congress of the party (1918) appointed a commit-
tee to draw up the new program of the -party. It was composed, in 
addition to Lenin, of six mem,bers: Stalin and five 'counter-revolu-
tionists': Bukharin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, V. Smirnov and Sokolnikov. 
"Finally, after the death of Lenin, the Thirteenth Congress of the 
Communist Party (May, 1924) appointed a Central Committee of 
fifty-three members. The Central Committee elected a Political 
Bureau of seven members. Who belonged to this body? Stalin and 
six 'enemies of the people':. Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, 
Tomsky, Trotsky. 
"From the founding of the Communist International (1919) until 
1929, all the essential reports were read to the Congresses of the 
C.I., all the essential resolutions were written, by five persons: Lenin 
and four 'enemies of the people'-Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek, and 
Bukharin. " 
"Not one of these Trotskyists belongs to the Leninist Old Guard"-
this statement by Cachin and Vaillant-Couturier in their pamphlet on 
the trial (page 3) is a flagrant untruth. 
8. A GLIMPSE AT THE MYSTERY OF THE TRIAL 
Pravda, on February 13th and 15th, 1937, carried a story that 
permits a glimpse of how accusations of Trotskyism are manufac-
tured in the U.S.S.R. -
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In Sverdlovsk (Ural) in January 1937, a meeting of the active 
party workers of the October section took place. Comrade Kravchuk, 
factory director, functionary of the People's Commissariat of Local 
Industry of the Russian Republic, was present. Kravchuk uttered the 
following sentence, among others: "I do not understand how Kaba-
kov (regional secretary of the party) could have sat so long beside 
the traitor Golovin!" (The reference is probably to a member of 
the Bureau of the regional committee who ./ had been proved a 
"Trotskyist." ) 
A harmless enough criticism. But Kabakov is regional secretary, 
a kind of Sverdlovsk Stalin! Under his direction, the committee of 
the October section, having learned of Kravchuk's "crime," expelled 
him from the party January 14th "jor counter-revolutionary Trotsky-
ist slander." At a time when Trotskyism is identified with fascism and 
subject to capital punishment, this motive for expulsion is heavy 
with threats! 
This was not all. Once the expulsion had been ordered, two tele-
grams were sent from Sverdlovsk to Moscow, addressed to the Peo-
ple's Commissar of Local Industry, Yukov. One telegram was signed 
by the chief of the industrial section of the regional committee of 
the party, Yan; the other by the regional secretary, Kabakov. The 
regional committee informed the People's Commissar that Kravchuk 
had been expelled from the party "for counter-revolutionary acts." 
They demanded that he be removed immediately, by telegraph. 
Yukov acted without delay. Kravchuk was relieved, by telegraph, 
of his functions; another director, nominated by the party commit-
tee, was appointed in his place. Note in passing the arbitrariness 
with which functionaries are named: anyone can be removed in 
twenty-four hours, without even ' being given a hearing, without 
recourse. We d'o not know whether Kravchuk was arrested. 
A month passed. But occurrences of this nature apparently multi-
plied to such a ' point that Pravda believed it necessary to condemn 
them in its leading editorial on Febrary 13th, 'and it was only then 
that tne Kravchuk case beca·me public. At once, engines reversed .... 
That very day, at Sverdlovsk, as soon as Pravda was received, the 
bureaus of the regional committee and the urban committee of the 
party annulled the expulsion of Kravchuk and decided to inaugurate 
a campaign of explanations around the editorial in Pravda 
February 13th. 
Imagine now that the scene had taken place, not in Sverdlovsk but 
in Moscow; that the criticism of Kravchuk was directed not at a 
regional secretary but at a member of the Political Bureau (for 
example, Ordjonikidze, . who sat for five years beside Piatakov) or 
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at the General Secretary, Stalin, who himself also sat for years on 
the Central Committee with the "traitors" Piatakov and Sokolnikov. 
This criticism, described as "Trotskyist slander" and accomp~nied 
by a telephone call to Yezhov (head of the G.P.U.) : "We have just 
discovered a counter-revolutio1Utry wrecker," would have brought 
about the expulsion of Kravchuk from the party, his demotion and, 
without doubt, his arrest. 
Pravda may criticize Kabakov (his downfall was certainly decided 
on in Moscow long before; the campaign against him cannot other-
wise be explained) ; but Yezhov-and especially "the genial leader" 
Stalin-are above all criticism. After a sojourn in prison, Kravchuk 
would certainly have "confessed" his crimes (Trotskyism, counter-
revolution, sabotage-only terrorism and espionage are missing). 
He would have figured in a nice little trial; Cachin and Vaillant-
Couturier would have been able to witness it in order to write later, 
in their admirable style, that "the guilt of Kravchuk was clearer than 
daylight." (See page 3 of their pamphlet on the Radek trial.) 
There is no smoke without fire, certainly; but in the U.S.S.R. 
"experts" have the power of transforming, often for reasons of base 
vengeance (as was the case with Kravchuk), harmless criticisms, mild 
conversations, and signs of discontent into crimes of high treason, 
sabotage, terrorism. 
9. SOME DATA ON THE ACCUSED* 
Piatakov, Georgi (1890·1937): Member of the Bolshevik party 
from 1910. First President of the Soviet government of the Ukraine 
(1918). Former head of the Soviet commercial agencies in Paris, 
later Director of the State Bank. Assistant Commissar of Heavy 
Industry from 1931 until the time of his a·rrest. Elected to the Cen-
tral Committee at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist party 
in January, 1934. (Up to the present, he is the sole "enemy of the 
people" to De a member of the current Central Committee.) . 
Radek, Karl (Born in 1885): Polish. An active worker in the 
Polish and German working class movement. Joined the Bolshevik 
party in 1917. Member of the Central Committee of the party from 
1919-1924, and of the Bureau of the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International. One of the editors of Izvestia from 1931. 
Spokesman of the Soviet government in foreign affairs. Member 
(with Bukharin) of the commisiion of twenty-five which drew up 
the present Soviet Constitution. 
*This data is incomplete, being based for the most part on the official Report 
oj Court Proceedings in the trial. 
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Sokolnikov, Gregory (Born in 1888) : Joined the Bolshevik party 
in 1905, at the age of seventeen. First People's Commissar of Banks. 
President of the Soviet delegation to the Brest negotiations in 1918, 
he signed the Brest Treaty. From 1921 to 1926, he was People's 
Commissar of Finances. Until 1935, he was Assistant People's Gom. 
missar of Foreign ,Affairs and Ambassador to London. Then-until 
his arrest-Assistant People's Commissar of the Forestry Industry. 
Elected candidate to the Central Committee at the Seventeenth Con· 
gress of the party (1934). 
Serebrialrov, Leonid (1888.1937): Of working class origin. He 
joined the Bolshevik party in 1905, at the 'age of seventeen. From 
1917 to 1919, he directed the Moscow Soviet. In 1919, he was elected 
secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; he was replaced by 
Stalin in that post in 1921. At the time of his arrest, he was an 
important functionary in the Commissariat of Railways. 
Lifshitz, Yacob (1896·1937) : Of working class origin. From 1935 
until his arrest, he was Assistant Commissar of Railways, where he 
"enjoyed the confidence of Stalin's comrade·in·arms, Kaganovich" 
(according to his last ' plea) . ' 
MurawfJ, Nikolai (1877-1937): .An agronomist, of working class 
family. He belonged to workers' groups in 1899, and entered the 
Bolshevik party in 1'905. In 1917, one of the leaders of the revolu-
tion in Moscow. First Military Commander of Red Moscow. The 
only defendant who did not write a declaration of repentance and 
who did not, before his arrest, condemn Trotsky and Trotskyism. 
Drobnis, Yacob (1891-1937): Shoemaker by origin, he joined the 
revolutionary movement and the Bolshevik party in 1906, at the age 
of fifteen. He spent six years in Tsarist prisons, 'and was three times 
threatened with capital punishment. Assistant Director of chemical 
factory construction in Kemerovo. 
Boguslavsky, Miklw,il (1886-1937): Old Bolshevik. He took an 
active part in the' civil war with the partisans, * then in the Red Army. 
Director of mines in Siberia. 
Kniazev, Ivan (1893.1937): Responsible functionary in the Rail-
way system. Collaborator of Dzerzhinsky when the latter was Peo· 
I pIe's Commissar of Railways. Twice head of the operations depart-
ment of the Commissariat. He "enjoyed the particular confidence of 
the People's Commissar, Kaganovich." (Last plea.) Director of the 
Southern Railways. 
TUTOk, Joseph (1900.1937): Joined the Bolshevik party in 1917, 
at the age of seventeen. He took an active part in the civil war. Direc· 
tor of the Ural Railways. 
·Volunteer civilian detachments. [Tr.] 
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Rataichak, Stanislas (1894.1937): Head of the Chemical Prod· 
ucts Industry, where he "enjoyed exceptional confidence on the part 
of our P~ople's Commissar of Heavy Industry (Ordjonikidze), on 
the part of the party .and the government." (Last plea.) 
Shestov, Alexis (1896·1937): Former worker, Old Bolshevik. 
Director of the Kuznetsk Coal Trust. F or five weeks after his arrest, 
he refused to confess. He and Radek were the only ones of the 
defendants who did not ask for mercy and who even refused to plead 
extenuating circumstances. 
Norkin, Boris (1895.1937): Director of chemical factory con· 
struction in Kemerovo. 
Pushin, Gavril (1896.1937): An engineer, a high functionary in 
the management of the chemical industries. 
Hrascke, Ivan (1886.1937): Teacher or professional spy. He 
entered the Bolshevik party in 1917. Minor functionary in the Com· 
missariat of Public Instruction. Since 1932 translator of Czech for 
the ·Communist International. Was never a Trotskyist. 
Stroilov, Mikhail (Born in 1899): Of peasant origin. Non.party. 
Chief engineer of the Kuznetsky Coal Trust. Candidate to the All· 
Russian Executive Committee. Sentenced to eight years in prison. 
ArnDld, Valentin (Born in 1894): Non.party adventurer, chauf· 
feur. Sentenced to ten years in prison. 
Among the hundreds of "wreckers" mentioned in the trial we cite: 
Bieker, director of the rubber industry; Kolegayev, director of the 
Ural Copper Trust; L. Maris ian, director of the State Bank until 
July 15, 1936; A. Maris ian, director of a military chemical factory, 
etc., etc. 
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